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Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain
Donald E. Campbell · Jerry S. Kelly
Abstract
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles
where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we
establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is
dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.
1. Introduction.
2. Framework.
3. Paths in NP(n, m) and an equivalence theorem.
4. Double induction basis: 3 individuals and 3 alternatives.
5. Induction on n (for m = 3).
6. Induction on m.
7. Conclusion.
8. References
1 Introduction
This paper shows that dictatorial rules are the only ones satisfying strategy-
proofness on the domainNP , the set of all profiles of strong preferences at which
no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. All existing proofs of Gibbard-
Satterthwaite employ profiles that are not in NP .1
There are two main reasons for studying strategy-proofness on NP . The
first is that profiles u not in NP may be quite unlikely. The society may be
large and the set of alternatives small. Then for no pair of alternatives is a
unanimous agreement likely.
Alternatively, in a two-stage group decision process the probability of Pareto
domination would be zero if the first stage narrows the set of alternatives by
rejecting, among others, alternatives that are Pareto-dominated. The domain
1Of the many proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the domain of all profiles
of strong orders (e.g., Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), Schmeidler and Sonnenschein
(1998), Barbera` (1980, 1983a, 1983b, 2001), Svensson (1999), Benoˆıt (2000), Reny (2001), Sen
(2001), Larsen and Svensson (2006)), every single one makes critical use of profiles in which
some alternatives Pareto-dominate others. For example, many invoke Arrow’s theorem after
first using a choice function to construct a social ordering by seeing which of two alternatives is
chosen when they are both brought to the top of everyone’s ordering, and so Pareto dominate
everything else. Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003) characterize the family of domains on which
every strategy-proof social choice function with full range is dictatorial, but only for domains
that are product sets.
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NP of surviving alternatives comprise the feasible set, from which the second
stage group chooses.
The second reason is that we might start with a (manipulable) rule g defined
on all profiles of strong preferences but where the restriction g|NP of g to NP is
strategy-proof. Then the conclusion that g|NP is dictatorial will help determine
the behavior of g. This paper stems from a companion paper (Campbell and
Kelly, 2014), which treated universally beneficial manipulation (UBM) rules -
defined by the property that if anyone manipulates, everyone gains and no one is
hurt. Such UBM rules must be strategy-proof on NP . Completing our classi-
fication analysis in that earlier paper requires proving a Gibbard-Satterthwaite
result on NP .
This domain NP is very large, even as a fraction of all profiles of strong
preferences, and so our result may not seem unexpected, but the difficulty of
our proof is surprising. Of course, whenever we take up a proper subdomain,
we must reconsider strategy-proofness, as we will have excluded manipulations
that would have been possible on the larger domain. But strategy-proofness is
more difficult to analyze here because NP is not a product set.
It should also be noted that just because NP is large is no guarantee of
dictatorship for full-range strategy-proof rules. There are supersets of NP for
which there do exist non-dictatorial strategy-proof rules: Suppose the number
of individuals, n, is odd, the set of alternatives is {x, y, z} and the domain is
D, the union of NP and the collection of all the profiles for which z is the top-
ranking alternative for every individual. The rule on D that selects the majority
winner between x and y at every profile in NP and selects z elsewhere in D is
non-dictatorial and has full range. It is strategy-proof because, for example, if
x is selected then someone ranks x above z and thus no individual who prefers
z to x can unilaterally cause z to be selected.
After introducing terminology and notation in Section 2, we prove some
intermediate results in Section 3. Then our main result is proved by induction.
The basis step, for three individuals and three alternatives is established in
Section 4. Induction on the number of individuals takes place in Section 5.
Then induction on the number of alternativess takes place in Section 6.
2 Framework.
For givenm, n ≥ 3, we consider a finite setX of alternatives where | X |= m
and finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals. A (strong) ordering on X is a
complete, asymmetric, transitive relation on X and the set of all such orderings
is L(X). For R ∈ L(X) and Y ⊂ X let R | Y denote the relation R ∩ Y × Y on
Y , the restriction of R to Y . If R is a member of L(X) we let R−1 denote the
inverse of R: That is, (x, y) ∈ R−1 if and only if (y, x) ∈ R.
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A profile p is a map from N to L(X), where p = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n))
and we write x ≻p(h) y if individual h strongly prefers x to y at profile p. The
set of all profiles is L(X)N . A domain ℘ is subset of L(X)N . For each subset
Y of X and each profile p in ℘ let p | Y denote the restriction of profile p ∈ ℘
to Y. That is, p | Y represents the function q | L(Y )N satisfying q(i) = p(i) | Y
for all i ∈ N . A social choice rule on ℘ is a function g : ℘ → X , where ℘ is a
nonempty subset of L(X)N . Rule g is dictatorial if there exists an individual i
such that for each profile p in ℘, alternative g(p) is the top-ranked element in
p(i) restricted to Range(g). A rule g is full-range if Range(g) = X .
In this paper, we consider social choice rules on the Non-Paretian do-
main, NP (n,m), the set of all profiles p ∈ L(X)N such that no alternative is
Pareto-dominates any other.
NP (n,m) = {p ∈ L(X)N : for every x, y ∈ X, if x 6= y, then we have
x ≻ p(i)y for some i ∈ N and y ≻p(j) x for some j ∈ N}
It is very important to note that NP (n,m) is not a Cartesian product set.
This will greatly complicate our analysis.
Two profiles p and q are h-variants, where h ∈ N , if q(i) = p(i) for all
i 6= h. Individual h can manipulate the social choice rule g : ℘→ X at p via p∗
if p and p∗ belong to ℘, p and p∗ are h-variants, and g(p∗) ≻p(h) g(p). And g is
strategy-proof if no one can manipulate g at any profile.
We will repeatedly use the following simple consequence of strategy-
proofness without explicitly alluding to it:
If we switch adjacent alternatives a and b in some individual i’s pref-
erence ordering, without changing anyone else’s preferences, then the selected
alternative will not change unless a is selected before the switch and b is selected
after and individual i preferred a to b initially, or b is selected before and a is
selected after and i preferred b to a initially.
Rule g on L(X)N satisfies universally beneficial manipulation (UBM)
if for every profile u and individual h such that there exists an h-variant profile
u∗ with g(u∗) ≻u(h) g(u), we have g(u
∗) ≻u(j) g(u) for every individual j. Our
primary motivation for studying strategy-proofness on NP (n,m) is that if g
satisfies UBM on L(X)N , then the restriction of g to NP (n,m) is strategy-
proof on that subdomain. The classification theorems (Campbell and Kelly,
2014) characterizing all UBM rules rely on the claim that if g : NP (n,m)→ X is
strategy-proof and has a range of at least three alternatives, then g is dictatorial.
We will exclude n = 2, for in that case every rule is strategy-proof on NP (n,m)
for the trivial reason that no two distinct profiles in NP (n,m) are i-variants of
one another.
3 Paths in NP(n, m) and an equivalence theo-
rem.
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From a global perspective, our proof will use two inductions. First, we show
strategy-proofness plus full range implies dictatorship for m = 3 and n = 3. We
show in Section 5 that the result for m = 3 and n implies the result for m = 3
and n + 1. Finally, Section 7 contains the proof that the result for m and n
implies the result for m+ 1 and n.
Those induction steps will require some preliminary theorems. One goal
of this section is to show that in our proof we can restrict attention to rules that
satisfy a full range assumption. Before that, we need to show that onNP (n,m),
any strategy proof rule g with range S has the property that u | S = u∗ | S
implies g(u) = g(u∗). On L(X)N , this is easy, just use a standard sequence
argument in the manner of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). But here,
becauseNP (n,m) is not a Cartesian product, those standard sequences can take
you outside NP (n,m). So we must find sequences of profiles all of which are
in NP (n,m). In addition, we may have to vary the order of individuals whose
preferences are to be changed (an order which is fixed in standard sequence
arguments). To deal with these problems, we start with a definition and then a
lemma.
Given two profiles u and u∗ in NP (n,m), consider a sequence of profiles
u1, u2, ..., uT , all in NP (n,m), such that
1. u1 = u;
2. uT = u
∗;
3. For each t, 1 ≤ t < T , there exists an h ∈ N
such that ut and ut+1are h-variants;
4. For each t, 1 ≤ t < T , ut | S = ut+1 | S.
We call such a sequence an S-path in NP (n,m) from u to u∗. Note two
obvious properties of S-paths:
1. If u1, u2, ..., uT is an S-path from u to v, then uT , uT−1, ..., u1 is
an S-path from v to u;
2. If u1, u2, ..., uT is an S-path from u to v, and v1, v2, ..., vT∗ is an
S-path from v to w, then u1, u2, ..., uT , v1, v2, ..., vT∗ is an S-path from u to
w.
We next prove two lemmas regarding S-paths in NP (n,m).
Lemma 3-1. Suppose there exists an x in X such that profiles u and
u∗ in NP (n,m) agree on S = X\{x}. Then for each of u, u∗, there is as S-path
in NP (n,m) from u to u∗
Proof :
We show that for each of u, u∗, there is as S-path in NP (n,m) from u to
u∗∗
u∗∗ :
1 2 · · · n
x u(2) | S · · · u(n) | S
u(1) | S x x
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Then an S-path from u to u∗ in NP (n,m) will be found by first following
the path from u to u∗∗ and then following - in reverse - the path from u∗ to u∗∗
(see properties 1 and 2 above).
If x is individual #1’s top alternative, then create the path to u∗∗ by
taking x down to the bottom for each i > 1 in turn.
Otherwise, we proceed by steps, raising x one rank in #1’s ordering
until it is #1’s top. We describe one such step. Without loss of generality,
suppose #1’s ordering, 1 : a...bcx..., with x in the position just below c. If
anyone else has c ≻u(j) x, we could bring x up just above c in #1’s ordering
and still be in NP (n,m). So assume x ≻u(j) c for all j > 1.
u :
1 2 . . . n
a
...
...
... x . . . x
b
...
...
c c . . . c
x
...
...
...
Whatever is between x and c (if anything) for #2, is either below x for #1 or in
{a, ..., b}. But if we are in NP (n,m), each of the alternatives in {a, ..., b} above
c for #2 must be below c, and so below x, for some individual j > 2. Then
we can bring x down just below c for #2 and stay in NP (n,m). That allows
us to bring x up just above c in #1’s ordering and still be in NP (n,m). This
continues until x has been raised to 1’s top. 
Now we extend that result in the S-Path Lemma. Note that this lemma is
not about a (strategy-proof) rule g - it is solely about the structure ofNP (n,m).
Lemma 3-2 For S any subset ofX , let u and u∗ be two profiles in NP (n,m)
with u | S = u∗ | S. Then there exists an S-path in NP (n,m) from u to u∗.
Proof: To establish the existence of a sequence of profiles in NP (n,m)
from u to u∗, we will show that there are S-path sequences in NP (n,m) from
each of u and u∗ to a profile u∗∗ we describe shortly. Then an S-path from u
to u∗ in NP (n,m) will be found by first following the path from u to u∗∗ and
then following - in reverse - the path from u∗ to u∗∗ (see properties 1 and 2
above). We suppose X\S = {x, y, ..., z} and let xy...z be a fixed ordering on
X\S. Then u∗∗ is given by
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u∗∗ :
1 2 · · · n
x
y u(2) | S u(n) | S
...
z
z z
u(1) | S
... · · ·
...
y y
x x
So individual #1 ranks everything in X\S above everything in S and ranks
the elements of S the same way as they are ranked in u(1). Individuals 2, ..., n
rank everything in S above everything in X\S and rank the elements of S the
same way they rank those elements at u. Finally individuals 2, ..., n rank the
elements of X\S as z...yx, the opposite of their ordering by #1.
We show that there is an S-path in NP (n,m) from both u and u∗
(which agree on S) to u∗∗ by a series of applications of Lemma 3-1. In this case
with X\S = {x, y, ..., z}, we first set S1 = X\{x} and so X\S1 = {x}. Then,
by Lemma 3-1, there is a path from u to the following profile u1:
u1 :
1 2 · · · n
x u(2) | S1 · · · u(n) | S1
u(1) | S1 x x
Next, take X = S1 and S2 = X\{y}. By Lemma 3-1, there is an S1-path and
so an S-path from u1|S1 to the following profile:
u2 :
1 2 · · · n
y u1(2) | S2 · · · u1(n) | S2
u1(1) | S2 y y
If we take each profile in that path and insert an x at the top of #1’s ordering
and x at the bottom for everyone else, we get an S-path from u1 to u3:
u3 :
1 2 . . . n
x u1(2) | S2 u1(n) | S2
y y . . . y
u1(1) | S2 x x
Combining these two paths sequentially yields a path from u to u3. Continuing
in this fashion we get an S2-path and so an S-path from u to u
∗∗. Continuing
in this pattern yields a path from u∗ to u∗∗, which was our goal. 
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Remark 1. The S-path lemma does not require that S be Range(g)
for a strategy-proof g, though that will be our primary application, as in the
Equivalence Theorem just below.
Remark 2. In the S-path lemma, S can even be a singleton, showing
that there is a path in NP (n,m) from any profile in NP (n,m) to any other.
These two remarks will not be used in this paper, but they serve to emphasize
that the S-path lemma is not about a social choice rule, but rather about the
domain NP (n,m).
Equivalence Theorem 3-3. For m,n ≥ 3, and any rule g that is
strategy-proof on NP (n, ,m) and has range S, if u | S = u∗ | S, then
g(u) = g(u∗).
Proof. Let u1, u2, ..., uT be an S-path in NP (n,m) from u to u
∗ as guar-
anteed by the S-path Lemma. If g(u) 6= g(u∗), there must be a t, 1 ≤ t < T ,
such that g(ut) 6= g(ut+1), where ut and ut+1 are h-variants. But individual h
orders g(ut) and g(ut+1) the same at ut and ut+1 since ut | S = ut+1 | S, so g
must be manipulable by h at either ut or ut+1. Therefore, g(u) = g(u
∗). 
This theorem will be the key at the conclusion to extending our analysis
from full-range rules to the more general case.
4 Induction basis: 3 individuals and 3 alterna-
tives.
Now let g be a strategy-proof social choice rule onNP (n,m) with |Range(g)|
≥ 3. We would like to show g is dictatorial, i.e., there exists an individual i
such that for each profile u in NP (n,m), alternative g(u) is the top-ranked
element in u(i) restricted to Range(g). In this and the next two sections, we do
this for the special case where Range(g) = X . Our goal, then, is to prove, for
m,n ≥ 3, the proposition SP (n,m): every strategy-proof rule on NP (n,m)
is dictatorial if it has full range.
Our analysis proceeds by induction on n first and then by induction on m.
The basis step deals with m = 3 and n = 3.
Theorem 4-3 (Basis). SP(3,3). That is, let g be a strategy-proof social
choice rule on NP (3, 3). If Range(g) = X , then g is dictatorial: there exists
an individual i such that for each profile u in NP (3, 3), g(u) is the top-ranked
element in u(i).
Proof: Assume X = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2, 3}. The proof consists of three
steps.
(Step 1) For any strategy-proof rule g onNP (3, 3), we show how choice
at a profile in V P , where V P is the subdomain of NP (3, 3) consisting of voting
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paradox profiles (where each alternative loses to some other under majority
voting), will lead to individual decisiveness for one alternative over another, on
all of NP (3, 3).
(Step 2) Then we show that if the range of strategy-proof g, restricted
to V P , is all of X , there must be a dictator for g.
(Step 3) Last, we show that if the range of g on NP (3, 3) is X then
the range of g restricted to V P is also X .
We begin with Step 1, the decisiveness result.
Lemma 4-4. If rule g is strategy-proof on NP (3, 3) then, for every
profile u in V P , if alternative α ∈ X = {a, b, c} is chosen at u, and α is top
for individual j while β ∈ X is j’s bottom at u, then g never chooses β at any
profile in NP where j prefers α to β; in this case we say j is decisive for α
against β on NP .
(If j is decisive for α against β, then we write αDjβ.)
Proof: Consider a voting paradox profile u:
u :
1 2 3
a b c
b c a
c a b
Without loss of generality, assume g(u) = a. We want to show for every profile
v in NP with a ≻v(1) c will have g(v) 6= c. Such profiles have v(1) = abc, acb,
or bac.
Case 1. v(1) = abc. So v is:
v :
1 2 3
a
b v(2) v(3)
c
Note g(u1) = a at u1, a 2-variant of u:
u1 :
1 2 3
a c c
b b a
c a b
or #2 will manipulate to u1 from u. Then look at u2, a 3-variant of u1:
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u2 :
1 2 3
a c
b b v(3)
c a
If g(u2) = c, then #3 would manipulate from u1 to u2. So g(u2) 6= c. But then
g(v) 6= c or #2 would manipulate from u2 to v. Therefore c is not chosen at
any profile in NP at which individual #1’s ordering is abc.
Case 2. v(1) = acb. One profile with person #1 having ordering acb is
u
′
, a simple 1-variant of u above:
u′ :
1 2 3
a b c
c c a
b a b
g(u′) = a or #1 would manipulate to u with u(1) = abc.
We trace out the consequences of this by considering the next figure,
where individual #1 has ordering acb, #2’s possible orderings are in different
rows, and #3’s preference orderings are in different columns. [Black cells are
not in NP (3, 3); gray background cells are in V P . “¬ c” in a cell means c
is not chosen there.] There is an “a” in cell (4, 5), i.e., row 4 and column 5,
in the main body of the table (i.e., not including the preference label row and
preference label column) indicating the outcome at that cell, which is the profile
u′. There is an “a” above that in (3, 5) or #2 (the row player) would manipulate
from (4, 5) to (3, 5). Similarly, there are “a”s in cells (4, 1) and (4, 2) or #3 (the
column player) would manipulate from there to (4, 5). An “a” appears in (6, 1)
or #2 would manipulate there from (4, 1). Three cells in row 4 are labeled “¬ c”
(i.e., “not c”) because c in such a cell would lead #3 to manipulate there from
(4, 5). Similarly for two cells in row 3.
1: acb
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32
a
b
c
a
c
b
b
a
c
b
c
a
c
a
b
c
b
a
a b c
a c b
b a c
¬c
a
¬c
b c a a a
¬c ¬c
a
¬c
c a b
c b a a
We extend this analysis in the next table, where the results just obtained
are emboldened and in regular (non-Italic). Now c can’t be chosen at (6, 3) or
#3 will manipulate to (6, 1). And that means c isn’t chosen at (5, 3) or #2
would manipulate from (6, 3) to (5, 3). At cells (1, 4) and (1, 6), alternative c
won’t be chosen because c is #2’s worst there and #2 would manipulate to row
3 (or 4).
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1: acb
3
2
a
b
c
a
c
b
b
a
c
b
c
a
c
a
b
c
b
a
a b c
¬c ¬c
a c b
b a c
¬c
a
¬c
b c a a a
¬c ¬c
a
¬c
c a b
¬c
c b a a
¬c
In the next table, again all the preceding results are emboldened . Sup-
pose c is chosen at cell (6, 4) indicated by “c?”. Then b is not chosen in (6, 3)
or #3 will manipulate there from (6, 4). Therefore a is chosen in (6, 3). In turn,
since a is #2’s bottom at (6, 3), a must also be chosen at (5, 3) and (4, 3). Since
c is chosen at (6, 4), a can’t be chosen at (4, 4), or #2 would manipulate from
there to (6, 4). Hence b is chosen at (4, 4). But that leads to a contradiction,
since now #3 would manipulate from (4, 3) to (4, 4). From all that, we can con-
clude c is not chosen at (6, 4) and that implies c is chosen nowhere in column 4
or #2 would manipulate up from (6, 4). We have determined that c is chosen
in none of the NP (3, 3) profiles with individual #1’s ordering acb.
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1: acb
3
2
a
b
c
a
c
b
b
a
c
b
c
a
c
a
b
a b c
¬c ¬c
a c b
b a c
¬c
a
¬c
b c a a a a
¬c
b
¬c,¬a
a
¬c
c a b a
¬c
c b a a a
¬c,¬b
c?
Case 3. v(1) = bac. In the next figure, we show the NP (3, 3) profiles
for which individual #1 has ordering bac. In twelve cells, we have entered “¬ c”
because, were c to be chosen at one of those cells, #1 (for whom c is worst)
would manipulate by changing his ordering to abc or acb, whichever would yield
a profile still in NP (3, 3) because we know that c wouldn’t be chosen at the
resulting profile.
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1: bac
3
2
a
b
c
a
c
b
b
a
c
b
c
a
c
a
b
c
b
a
a b c
¬c
a c b
¬c ¬c
b a c
¬c
b c a
¬c ¬c
c a b
¬c ¬c ¬c
c b a
¬c ¬c ¬c
Since c is not chosen in cell (5, 6) where c is at the top of #3’s ordering,
c must not be chosen anywhere in row 5 or else #3 would manipulate there from
(5, 6). But in row 5, c is at the top of #2’s ordering and so c can’t be chosen
anywhere in the table or #2 would manipulate there from row 5. 
Step 2 of the proof consists of proving the following corollaries.
Corollary 4-4-1. Suppose g is a strategy-proof rule on NP (3, 3): then
if g is dictatorial on V P , it is dictatorial on all of NP (3, 3).
Corollary 4-4-2. Suppose g is a strategy-proof rule on NP (3, 3): then
if g has singleton range on V P , it has singleton range on all of NP (3, 3).
Proof of these first two corollaries is easy.
Corollary 4-4-3. Suppose g is a strategy-proof rule on NP (3, 3):
then:if g has range X on V P, then it is dictatorial on all of NP (3, 3).
Proof of Corollary 4-4-3: It suffices, by Corollary 4-4-1, to show that
if g has range X on V P , then it is dictatorial on V P .
So consider the twelve profiles in V P :
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1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb not c 2 : abc
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab not c 2 : cba not c 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba not c 2 : cab 2 : bac
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac not c 2 : abc 2 : acb
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac
Without loss of generality, we assume that g yields a at the first profile. There-
fore, by Lemma 4, individual #1 is decisive for a against c, which we write
aD1c. That implies c is not chosen at profiles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Also g can not
yield b at profile 10 or else bD2a, contrary to the outcome at profile 1.
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Profile 2. Suppose b were chosen at profile 2:
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb not c 2 : abc not a
3 : cab 3 : cba not a; ∴ b 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab not c; b? 2 : cba not c 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba not c; 2 : cab 2 : bac
3 : bac not a; ∴ b 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac not c 2 : abc 2 : acb not a
3 : cba not a; ∴ b 3 : cab 3 : bac
Then by Lemma 4, bD3a, which implies a is not chosen at profiles 3, 4, 5, 9,
and 12. But that implies b is chosen at each of profiles 3, 4, and 5. These
results imply bD3c, bD2c, and bD1c, respectively. But at any profile in NP, at
least one of the individuals must prefer b to c, so c would never be chosen in
NP (3, 3). So now we may assume b is not chosen at profile 2. Since we already
know c isn’t chosen there, a must be chosen. Now b can’t be chosen at profile
9 or bD3a, contrary to the choice of a at profile 2. All results up to this point
are emboldened in the next display.
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Profiles 3 and 4. Suppose b were chosen at profile 3. Then bD3c, and
so c is not chosen at profiles 7, 9, 10, and 12.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb not c 2 : abc not b
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca not c; ∴ a
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba not c 2 : bca not b;
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc not c; ∴ a
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba not c; b? 2 : cab not c 2 : bac not c
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac not c 2 : abc not c 2 : acb not c
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac
At profile 9, neither b nor c is chosen, so a must be. Therefore, aD2c which
implies c is not chosen at profiles 8 or 11. Then c would not be in the range
of g restricted to V P . All that was a consequence of assuming b was chosen at
profile 3. So b isn’t chosen there which means a is. But then aD1b, so b is not
chosen at profile 4, and therefore a must be chosen there.
16
Profile 5.
Assume that a is also chosen at profile 5. Then aD2b and so b is not
chosen at profiles 7, 8, and 12.
If a were also chosen at profile 6, everyone would be decisive for a
against b and b would never be chosen on NP (3, 3). So a is not chosen there
which means that b is chosen there. But then bD1c and so c is not chosen at
profiles 7 and 8. This means a is chosen at each of those profiles and that implies
everyone is decisive for a against c and c would never be chosen on NP (3, 3).
Therefore our assumption that a is chosen at profile 5 fails and b must be chosen
there. Since b is chosen at profile 5, bD1c and thus c is not chosen at profiles 7
and 8.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb not c; a? 2 : abc not b
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba not c 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb not a; ∴ b 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba a 2 : cab not b 2 : bac
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac a 2 : abc not b 2 : acb not b
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac
If a were also chosen at profile 6, everyone would be decisive for a against b and
b would never be chosen on NP (3, 3). So a is not chosen there which means
that b is chosen there. But then bD1c and so c is not chosen at profiles 7 and
8. This means a is chosen at each of those profiles and that implies everyone
is decisive for a against c and c would never be chosen on NP (3, 3). Therefore
our assumption that a is chosen at profile 5 fails and b must be chosen there.
Since b is chosen at profile 5, bD1c and thus c is not chosen at profiles 7 and 8.
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Profile 6.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb b 2 : abc not b
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba not c; a? 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba a 2 : cab not c; 2 : bac
3 : bac 3 : abc not b; ∴ a 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac a 2 : abc not c 2 : acb
3 : cba 3 : cab not b; ∴ a 3 : bac
Suppose a is chosen at profile 6, so that aD3b. This implies b is not chosen
at profiles 7 and 8, so a is chosen there. But then everyone is decisive for a
against c and c would never be chosen on NP (3, 3). Accordingly, a must not
be chosen at profile 6, so b must be. Because b is chosen at profiles 5 and 6,
neither individual 2 nor 3 can be decisive for a against b, and thus a cannot be
selected at profiles 11 or 12.
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Profiles 7 and 8.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb b 2 : abc not b
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba b 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc not c; ∴ a
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba a 2 : cab not c; a? 2 : bac not a
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb not c; ∴ b
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac a 2 : abc not c 2 : acb not a
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac not c; ∴ b
Now suppose a is chosen at profile 7 so that, by Lemma 4, aD3c. Then c is
not chosen at profiles 10, 11, and 12. But b being chosen at 11 and 12 implies
bD2c and bD3c, which in turn imply c is never chosen on NP (3, 3). So a is not
chosen at profile 7, so b must be. Thus bD1a and a is not chosen at profile 8,
so b is chosen there.
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Profile 9.
Suppose a is chosen at profile 9. Then aD2c and so c is also not chosen
at profiles 11 or 12 so b is chosen there. But then bD2c and bD3c. Thus c is
not in the range of g restricted to NP (3, 3), a contradiction. So we can’t have
a chosen at profile 9 and thus c is chosen there.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb b 2 : abc not b; a?
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba b 2 : bca not b
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc not c; ∴ a
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba a 2 : cab b 2 : bac not a
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb not c;
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac a 2 : abc b 2 : acb not a
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac not c;
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Profiles 10, 11, and 12.
Having c chosen at profile 9 implies cD1b, so b is not chosen at profiles
11 or 12, so c is also chosen there. And if a were chosen at 10, we would have
aD3c, contrary to the choice of c at profile 11. So c is also chosen at profile 11
and #1 is a dictator on V P .
Step 3, the last stage in the proof of Theorem 3, is showing that if
strategy-proof g on NP (3, 3) has range X , then so does the restriction of g to
V P . Equivalently, we show that if the range of g restricted to V P has range of
just two alternatives, say {a, b}, then c is not in the range of g.
Case A. Suppose a is chosen at some profile u in V P where only one
person prefers a to b but c is not chosen in V P . Apart from permutations of
individuals, u must be
u :
1 2 3
a c b
c b a
b a c
Thus, aD1b and so a is chosen at the 6 out of 12 profiles in V P where #1
prefers a to b.
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca a 2 : acb 2 : abc a
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab a 2 : cba 2 : bca a
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba a 2 : cab 2 : bac
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac a 2 : abc 2 : acb
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac
By profile 2, aD1c, by profile 9, aD2c and by profile 10, aD3c. Lemma 4-4
implies we must have c is not in the range of g.
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Case B. Alternative a is never chosen when only one person prefers a
to b under our supposition that c does not belong to the range of g restricted
to V P .
1 5 9
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : bca 2 : acb b 2 : abc
3 : cab 3 : cba 3 : bca
2 6 10
1 : abc 1 : bac 1 : cab
2 : cab 2 : cba b 2 : bca
3 : bca 3 : acb 3 : abc
3 7 11
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : cba b 2 : cab 2 : bac b
3 : bac 3 : abc 3 : acb
4 8 12
1 : acb 1 : bca 1 : cba
2 : bac b 2 : abc 2 : acb b
3 : cba 3 : cab 3 : bac
By profile 5, bD1c; by profile 4, bD2c; and by profile 3, bD3c. Then Lemma 4
implies c is not in the range of g. 
5 Induction on n.
We have established SP (n,m) for n = 3 and m = 3. We want to extend
this to more individuals (but still for m = 3) by induction on n. The analysis
of this section calls for defining rules on NP (n, 3) as retrictions of rules on
NP (n + 1, 3) to subdomains. In particular, we want to define two rules on
NP (n, 3) by considering their images at a profile p = (p(1), ..., p(n)):
g∗(p) = g(p(1), p(2), ..., p(n− 1), p(n), p(n)) and
g∗∗(p) = g(p(1), p(1), p(2), ..., p(n− 1), p(n))
We will need these rules to be of full range when g is of full range. Accord-
ingly, we define two subdomains of NP (n+ 1, 3):
NP ∗(n + 1, 3) is the subdomain of NP (n + 1, 3) consisting of all p ∈
NP (n+ 1, 3) such that p(n) = p(n+ 1);
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NP ∗∗(n + 1, 3) is the subdomain of NP (n + 1, 3) consisting of all p ∈
NP (n+ 1, 3) such that p(1) = p(2).
Recall that SP (n, 3) is the statement: “every strategy-proof rule on
NP (n, 3) is dictatorial if it has full range.”
Theorem 6-1. SP (n, 3) implies SP (n+ 1, 3).
Proof: Assume that SP (n, 3) is true. Let g be a given strategy-proof
social choice function on NP (n+ 1, 3) that has full range.
We need to carry out several steps:
1. Given the set N = {1, 2, ..., n, n+ 1} of individuals, we let
N∗ = {1, 2, ..., n}.
2. Associate with each profile p on X in NP (n, 3) two profiles,
p∗ and p∗∗ on X in NP (n+ 1, 3).
3. Define g∗ on NP (n, 3) by relating g∗(p) to g(p∗) and define
g∗∗ on NP (n, 3) by relating g∗∗(p) to g(p∗∗).
4. Show that strategy-proofness of g on NP (n+ 1, 3) implies
strategy-proofness of g∗ and g∗∗ on NP (n, 3).
5. Show that Range(g) = X implies Range(g∗) = X and
Range(g∗∗) = X . This step is carried out in companion paper
Campbell and Kelly, 2014b).
6. Conclude by the induction hypothesis that g∗ and g∗∗ are dictatorial.
7. Show that the dictatorship of g∗ and g∗∗ implies dictatorship for g.
For the second step, given a profile p = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n)) in NP (n, 3), let
p∗ = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n), p(n))
where the last two orderings are the same, and
p∗∗ = (p(1), p(1), p(2), ..., p(n))
where the first two orderings are the same.
Remark: p is in NP(n, 3) if and only if p∗ is in NP (n+1, 3); and
p is in NP (n, 3) if and only if p∗∗ is in NP (n+ 1, 3).
For the third step, we define g∗ and g∗∗ as at the beginning of this
section.
For the fourth step, we need to show g∗ and g∗∗ are strategy-proof. Con-
sider rule g∗: If individual i < n can manipulate g∗ at some profile (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n))
then that individual can obviously manipulate g at profile (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n), p(n))
because
g∗(p(1), p(2), ..., p(n)) = g(p(1), p(2), ..., p(n), p(n)).
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Next, we show that the remaining individual, n, cannot manipulate g∗. Sup-
pose to the contrary that n manipulates g∗ at profile p = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n −
1), p(n)) in NP (n, 3) with g∗(p) = x, by submitting ordering v and getting pro-
file q = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n−1), v) in NP (n, 3) with g∗(q) = y 6= x and y ≻p(n) x.
g(p(1), p(2), ..., p(n− 1), p(n), p(n)) = x; and
g(p(1), p(2), ..., p(n− 1), v, v) = y.
Note by the remark above, that these profiles are in NP (n+ 1, 3).
Construct profile w = (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n − 1), p(n), v). Note that w is in
NP (n+1, 3). Now x ≻p(n) g(w) or g is manipulable by n+1 at (p(1), p(2), ..., p(n−
1), p(n), p(n)), and g(w) ≻p(n) y or g is manipulable by n at w. Transitivity
then implies x ≻p(n) y, contrary to our earlier assumption of manipulability of
g∗. Therefore, g∗ is strategy-proof.
An analogous argument establishes the strategy-proofness of g∗∗.
For the fifth step, as noted above, Range(g∗) = Range(g∗∗) = X is
proven as the n-Range Lemma in (Campbell and Kelly, 2014b).
It follows from Steps 4 and 5, and our induction hypothesis, that g∗ and
g∗∗ are dictatorial. We now want to prove that existence of a dictator for each
of g∗ and for g∗∗ enables us to determine a dictator for g.
Case 1. The dictator for g∗ is an individual j < n. Without loss of
generality, j = 1. Let x be an arbitrary member of X , and let
q = (q(1), q(2), p(3), ..., q(n), q(n+ 1))
be any profile in NP (n + 1, 3) with the topmost element of q(1) being x. Let
p = (q(1), p(2), ..., p(n− 1), p(n), p(n+ 1)) be a profile with p(1) = q(1) and for
all i > 1, p(i) is the inverse of p(1). Note that p ∈ NP (n, 3). Now g(p) = x
since p(n) = p(n+ 1) and #1 is a dictator for g∗.
Next we consider a standard sequence from p to q:
p1 = p = (p(1), p(2), p(3), ..., p(n), p(n)) = (q(1), p(2), ..., p(n), p(n))
p2 = (q(1), q(2), p(3), ..., p(n), p(n))
...
pn = (q(1), q(2), q(3), ..., q(n), p(n))
pn+1 = q = (q(1), q(2), q(3), ..., q(n), q(n+ 1)).
Note that every profile in this sequence is an element of NP (n+ 1, 3), and
that g(p) = x. Then also g(p2) = x since otherwise, with x at the bottom of
p(2), g would be manipulable by #2 at p1. Similarly, g(p3) = x or g would be
manipulable by #3 at p2. Continuing in this fashion, g(q) = x and so #1 is a
dictator for g.
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Case 2. The dictator for g∗∗ is an individual j > 1. Using the argument
of Case 1 as a template, we can show that j + 1 is a dictator for g.
Case 3. The dictator for g∗ is individual n and the dictator for g∗∗ is
#1. Consider a profile u such that u(1) = u(2) = xy...z and u(n) = u(n+ 1) =
z...yx. This profile is in NP (n+ 1, 3). Since #1 is a dictator for g∗∗, g(u) = x;
since n is a dictator for g∗, g(u) = z. This contradiction shows Case 3 isn’t
possible. 
6 Induction on m.
We have established that SP (n, 3) holds for all n ≥ 3. We now show
Theorem 6-1. For arbitrary n ≥ 3 and arbitrary m ≥ 3 the statement
SP (n,m) implies SP (n,m+ 1).
Proof : Assume that SP (n,m) is true.
Let g be a given strategy-proof social choice function on NP (n,m+ 1)
that has full range. Now we define a rule g∗ based on g. Select arbitrary,
but distinct, w and z in X . Let NPwz(n,m + 1) be the set of profiles in
NP (n,m+ 1) such that alternatives w and z are contiguous in each individual
ordering. Choose some alternative x∗ that does not belong to X and set X∗ =
{x∗} ∪X\{w, z}. Then g∗ will have domain D∗ by which we mean the domain
NP (n,m) when the feasible set is X∗. To define g∗ we begin by selecting
arbitrary profile p ∈ D∗, and then we choose some profile r ∈ NPwz(n,m+ 1)
such that
1. r|X\{w, z} = p|X\{w, z}, and
2. for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, we have
{x ∈ X\{w, z} : x ≻r(i) w} = {x ∈ X\{w, z} : x ≻p(i) x
∗}.
In words, we create r from p by replacing x∗ with w and z so that w and z
are contiguous in each r(i), and r does not exhibit any Pareto domination, and
in each r(i) either w or z occupies the same rank as x∗ in p(i). We next show
that the selected alternative, which we can denote f(p), is independent of the
choice of profile r.
Suppose that s and t both belong to NPwz(n,m + 1) and both 1 and 2
hold for r = s and r = t. We will show that if t 6= s there is a profile r′ in
NPwz(n,m+ 1) and an individual h such that
r′(i) = s(i) for all i 6= h and r′(h) = t(h) 6= s(h) and
g(r′) = g(s) if g(s) ∈ X\{w, z}, and g(r′) ∈ {w, z} if g(s) ∈ {w, z}.
That will establish that we can create t from s in a serious of stages without
changing the selected alternative unless it changes from w to z or from z to w.
We have shown that g∗(p) is independent of the choice of r in NPwz(n,m+1),
provided that 1 and 2 are both satisfied. Thus g∗ is well defined.
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Choose some j in {1, 2, ..., n} such that s(j) 6= t(j). Without loss of
generality, assume that w ≻t(j) z. Create u from s by switching w and z in
s(j). If u ∈ NPwz(n,m + 1) then the fact that w and z are contiguous in s
and strategy-proofness of g imply that g(u) = g(s) if g(s) ∈ X\{w, z}, and
g(u) ∈ {w, z} if g(s) ∈ {w, z}. Set r′ = u.
Suppose that u /∈ NP (n,m + 1). Then we must have z ≻t(i) w for all
i 6= j. Because z does not Pareto dominate w at t and we have t(j) 6= s(j), and
u(i) = s(i) for all i 6= j there exists an individual h such that z ≻s(h) w and
t(h) 6= s(h). Then switch w and z in s(h) to form v ∈ NPwz(n,m+1). Strategy-
proofness of g implies that g(v) = g(s) if g(s) ∈ X\{w, z}, and g(v) ∈ {w, z} if
g(s) ∈ {w, z}. Set r′ = v.
Therefore, we can use arbitrary f satisfying 1 and 2 above to define g∗ as
follows.
Definition: g∗(p) = g(f(p)) if g(f(p)) ∈ X\{w, z} and g∗(p) = x∗ if
g(f(p)) ∈ {w, z}.
The rule g∗ is obviously strategy-proof if g is. Them-Range Lemma in the
companion paper (Campbell and Kelly, 2014b) establishes that the range of g∗
is X∗. We can now claim that g∗ is dictatorial using the induction hypothesis.
Without loss of generality, assume that person 1 is the dictator for g∗.
We will show that person 1 is a dictator for g and that will establish SP (n,m+1).
We prove dictatorship of g by showing that, for arbitrary x ∈ X , g(p) = x for
any profile in NP (n,m + 1) that has x at the top of person 1’s preference
ordering. The first step is to show that if x is selected at some profile that has
x at the top of person 1’s ordering and at the bottom of everyone else’s, then g
will select x at any profile for which it is the top ranked alternative of person
1. Again, the analysis is complicated by the need to stay inside NP (n,m+ 1).
Lemma 6-2: For any x ∈ X , if there is a profile r ∈ NP (n,m) such that
g(r) = x, and x is at the top of r(1) but at the bottom of r(i) for all i > 1 then
g(p) = x for any profile p in NP (n,m+ 1) such that x is at the top of p(1).
Proof : Let p be an arbitrary member of NP (n,m+1) such that x is at the
top of p(1). By hypothesis, there exists a profile r ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such that
g(r) = x, and x is at the top of r(1) and the bottom of r(i) for all i > 1. This
justifies the first in the following sequence of statements, and each of the others
follows from its predecessor by strategy-proofness of g, as we explain at the end
of the list.
1. g(r(1), r(2), r(3), ..., r(n − 1), r(n)) = x
2. g(r(1), r(1)−1, r(1)−1, ..., r(1)−1, r(1)−1) = x
3. g(r(1), p(1)−1, p(1)−1, ..., p(1)−1, r(1)−1) = x
4. g(p(1), p(1)−1, p(1)−1, ..., p(1)−1, r(1)−1) = x
5. g(p(1), p(1)−1, p(3), ..., p(n− 1), p(n)) = x
6. g(p(1), p(2), p(3), ..., p(n− 1), p(n)) = x.
26
Note that each of the six profiles belongs to NP (n,m + 1). Statement 1
implies 2 because we can replace r(2) with r(1)−1. Alternative x will still be
selected because x is selected at the previous stage and x is bottom ranked
by r(2). Then replace r(3) with r(1)−1. Alternative x will still be selected
because x is selected at the previous stage and x is bottom ranked by r(3).
And so on. Statement 2 implies 3 because we can replace person i’s ordering
r(i)−1 with p(1)−1 one individual at a time, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Because x is
bottom ranked by r(i)−1, if x is not selected after replacing r(i)−1 with p(1)−1
for individual i that person could manipulate at the profile for which r(1)−1 is
his true preference. Statement 3 implies 4 because the fourth profile is obtained
from the third by replacing r(1) with p(1), and x is top ranked by p(1) so
person 1 could manipulate at the fourth profile if x were not selected there.
Statement 4 implies 5 because we can replace person i’s ordering with p(i) one
individual at a time, for i ≥ 3. Because x is bottom ranked by p(1)−1 and
r(1)−1, if x is not selected after replacing i’s ordering at profile 4 that person
could manipulate at the pre-replacement profile. Finally, statement 5 implies 6
because the last profile is obtained from its predecessor by changing person 2’s
ordering, replacing p(1)−1 with p(2) and x is at the bottom of p(1)−1. 
Now we establish that there is a profile r in NP (n,m + 1) such that
g(r) = x and x is at the top of r(1) and at the bottom of r(i) for all i > 1.
Lemma 6-3: For each x ∈ X there is a profile p ∈ NP (n,m+1) such that
g(p) = x, and x is at the top of p(1) but at the bottom of p(i) for all i > 1.
Proof : Step 1: We show that, for arbitrary x ∈ X\{w, z}, we have g(p) = x
for any p ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that x is at the top of p(1).
Let α be any member of L(X) such that x is at the top of α and w and
z are contiguous in α. Set r = (α, α−1, α−1, ..., α−1). We have g(r) = x because
person 1 dictates g∗. By Lemma 6-2, g(p) = x for any p ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such
that x is at the top of p(1).
The previous paragraph will not suffice when x ∈ {w, z} because the
dictatorship of g∗ only establishes that g selects either w or z when those two al-
ternatives rank first and second (in either order) in person 1’s preference scheme.
We need to show that g selects w (resp., z) when w (resp., z) ranks at the top
for person 1.
Step 2: We show that if person 1’s ordering has a member of {w, z} at the
top then g will select 1’s first or second ranked alternative.
Let q be any profile in NP (n,m+1) such that z ranks first in q(1) and
w ranks second, or w ranks first in q(1) and z ranks second. (Note that q does
not have to belong to NPwz(n,m+ 1).) We show that g(q) ∈ {w, z}. Let r be
the profile for which r(1) = q(1), and r(i) = q(1)−1 for all i ≥ 2. We have g(r) ∈
{w, z} because person 1 dictates g∗. Then g(r(1), q(2), q(3), ..., q(n− 1), r(n)) ∈
{w, z} by strategy-proofness of g. (For 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 replace r(i) with q(i) one
individual at a time. The fact that r(n) = r(1)−1 guarantees that we remain in
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NP (n,m+1).) We have g(q) = g(r(1), q(2), q(3), ..., q(n− 1), q(n)) ∈ {w, z} by
strategy-proofness of g.
Now, let p be any profile in N(n,m+1) such that p(1) = zx... for some
x ∈ X\{w, z}. We prove g(p) ∈ {z, x}. Let β be any member of L(X) such that
x ranks first and z ranks second. Let r denote the profile (β, β−1, β−1, ..., β−1).
We have g(r) = x by Step 1. This is the first in the following sequence of
statements. Each of statements 2 through 5 follows from its predecessor by
strategy-proofness of g, as we explain in the paragraph following the list.
1. g(r(1), r(1)−1, r(1)−1, ..., r(1)−1, r(1)−1) = x
2. g(r(1), r(1)−1, p(1)−1, ..., p(1)−1, p(1)−1) = x
3. g(p(1), r(1)−1, p(1)−1, ..., p(1)−1, p(1)−1) ∈ {x, z}
4. g(p(1), p(2), p(3), ..., p(n− 1), p(1)−1) ∈ {x, z}
5. g(p(1), p(2), p(3), ..., p(n− 1), p(n)) ∈ {x, z}
Statement 1 implies 2 because, for i ≥ 3, we can replace person i’s ordering
r(i) = r(1)−1 with p(1)−1 one individual at a time. Then x will still be selected
at each stage because it is at the bottom of r(i), and if it were not selected at the
new profile then person i could manipulate at the previous profile. Statement
2 implies 3 by strategy-proofness because we replace r(1) with p(1) which has
z ranked first and x second. Statement 3 implies 4 because, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
we replace r(i) = r(1)−1 or p(1)−1 with p(i), one individual at a time. Then
strategy-proofness of g implies that x or z will still be selected because x ranks
at the bottom of r(i) = r(1)−1 with z second last and p(1)−1 has z ranked
last and x second last. Statement 4 implies 5 because we replaced person n’s
ordering, p(1)−1, which has z ranked last and x second last.
Similarly, if p(1) = (w, x, ...) then g(p) ∈ {w, x}.
Step 3: Suppose that there exists t ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(t) = z and
z is at the top of t(1). We show that there exists a profile u ∈ NP (n,m + 1)
such that g(u) = z and z is at the top of u(1) and at the bottom of u(i) for all
i > 1. And if there exists t′ ∈ NP (n,m + 1) such that g(t′) = w and w is at
the top of t′(1) then there is a profile u′ ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(u′) = w
and w is at the top of u′(1) and at the bottom of u′(i) for all i > 1.
By hypothesis, there exists a profile t ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) such that g(t) =
z and t(1) = zxy.... That is, z ranks first in t(1), and the second ranking
alternative is denoted by x, with y third. Without loss of generality we assume
that z ≻t(i) x for all i ≤ k (possibly k = 1) and x ≻t(i) z for all i > k. We
have k < n because z does not Pareto dominate x. Define p ∈ NP (n,m+1) by
setting p(i) = t(i) for all i ≤ k and p(i) = t(1)−1 for all i > k. If we change t(i)
for i > k one individual at a time, alternative z will be selected at each stage.
(Step 2 implies that either z or x will be selected, and if x is selected then
the individual whose ordering has changed could manipulate at the previous
profile.) Therefore, g(p) = z. If k = 1 set u = p.
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If k > 1 create q from p by setting q(2) = y...zx, with q(i) = p(i) for all
i 6= 2. (That is, q(2) is any ordering with y on top, x last, and z second last.)
We have q ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) because p(n) = t(1)−1. And g(q) ∈ {z, x} by Step
2. If g(q) = x then person 2 can manipulate at q via p(2). Thus, g(q) = z.
Recall that q(n) = p(n) = t(1)−1. Create r from q by switching the
order of y and x in q(n), with r(i) = q(i) for all i 6= n. We have r(n) = ...xyz
and y ≻q(2) x. Therefore, r ∈ NP (n,m+ 1). Step 2 implies that g(r) ∈ {z, x}.
If g(r) = x then person n can manipulate at q via r(n). Therefore, g(r) = z.
Create s from r by switching the order of y and x in r(1) = t(1), with
s(i) = r(i) for all i > 1. We have s ∈ NP (n,m + 1) because x ≻r(n) y.
Strategy-proofness implies g(s) = z.
Now create u2 from s by switching the order of z and x in s(2). We
have u2(2) = y...xz, and u2 ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) because z ≻s(1) x. Step 2 implies
g(u2) ∈ {z, y}, but if g(u2) = y then person 2 can manipulate at s via u2(2).
Therefore, g(u2) = z. If k = 2 we have z at the top of u2(1) and at the bottom
of u2(i) for all i > 1, in which case we can set u = u2. The following table
specifies t(1) for the given profile t and also summarizes the changes that have
been made. It only identifies the ordering for the individuals whose preferences
have altered. We have established that alternative z is selected at each stage.
Sketch of proof that u exists when k = 2
t(1) = zxy...
p(i) = t(1)−1 for all i > k
q(2) = y...zx
r(n) = ...xyz
s(1) = zyx, ...
u2(2) = y...xz
If k > 2 create u3 from u2 by replacing u2(3) with u2(2). Strategy
proofness implies that g(u3) = z. Continue in this fashion until we have g(uk) =
z, with z on top of uk(1) and at the bottom of uk(i) for all i > 1. Then set
u = uk.
Similarly, we can prove the existence of a profile u′ in NP (n,m + 1)
such that g(u′) = w, with w at the top of u′(1) and at the bottom of u′(i) for
all i > 1.
Step 4: We show that, for arbitrary a ∈ {w, z}, there does in fact exist a
profile t ∈ NP (n,m+1) such that g(t) = a and a is at the top of t(1). Without
loss of generality, a = z.
Alternative z is in the range of g so there is a profile q ∈ NP (n,m+ 1)
such that g(q) = z. Suppose that z is not the top alternative of q(1). Step 1
implies that the top alternative of q(1) does not belong to X\{w, z}. Therefore,
q(1) = (w, ...). Step 2 implies that the alternative ranked second by q(1) must
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be z. Therefore, q(1) = wz... and g(q) = z. If w ≻q(j) z for some j > 1 then let
r ∈ NP (n,m+ 1) be the profile for which r(i) = q(i) for all i > 1 and r(1) is
obtained from q(1) by switching w and z. Then g(r) = z by strategy-proofness.
Set t = r.
Suppose that z ≻q(i) w for all i > 1. Create p from q by moving z down
in q(2) until it’s just above w in person 2’s ordering, preserving
p(2)|X\{z} = q(2)|X\{z},
with p(i) = q(i) for all i 6= 2. (Then p = q if w and z are contiguous in q(2).)
We have p ∈ NP (n,m + 1) because z ≻q(1) x for all x ∈ X\{w, z}. We have
g(q) = z, and g(p) ∈ {w, z} by Step 2. Therefore, g(p) = z by strategy proofness.
Create profile s from p by switching w and z in p(2), with s(i) = p(i) = q(i) for
all i 6= 2. Step 2 implies g(s) ∈ {w, z}. If g(s) = w then we have a profile at
which w is at the top of person 1’s ordering and w is selected. But then Lemma
6-2 and Step 3 of this lemma imply that w is selected whenever it is at the top
of person 1’s ordering, contradicting g(q) = z. Therefore, g(s) = z. Switch w
and z in s(1) to create profile t for which z is at the top of person 1’s ordering
and z is selcted (by strategy-proofness). 
Lemmas 6-2 and 6-3 imply that person 1 dictates g, and so we have
shown SP (n,m+ 1). 
7 Conclusion
Combining the basis result, Theorem 5-1 and Theorem 6-1, we have
Theorem 7-1. For all m,n ≥ 3, SP (n,m).
Important as this result is, we are also interested in rules that have less
than full range. Consider the rule g defined as follows, where we assume X is
large: m > 3. Fix three alternatives, {a, b, c} = S in X . At profile u, let ψ(u)
be the highest ranked alternative from S according to ordering u(1). Then
g(u) = ψ(u) unless there is a unique x ∈ X that Pareto-dominates ψ(u), in
which case g(u) = x. This is a UBM rule with full range. But the restriction
g∗ of g to NP has range that is only S. This rule g∗ is then of less than full
range but is dictatorial on NP . That is a direct consequence of Theorem 7-1
and the Equivalence Theorem from Section 3.
Theorem 7-2. Let g∗ be a strategy-proof rule on NP (n,m) for n ≥ 3
and m ≥ 3 with Range(g∗) = S and |S| ≥ 3. Then S is dictatorial.
Proof: For a fixed ordering x, y, ..., z of X\S, define a rule g∗∗ on
NP (n, |S|) as follows: for profile u inNP (n, |S|), construct profile u∗ inNP (n,m)
as
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u∗ :
1 2 . . . n
x
...
...
y u(2) . . . u(n)
...
...
...
z
... z . . . z
u(1)
...
...
... y y
x x
Then define g∗∗(u) = g∗(u∗). It is easy to show that g∗∗ is strategy-proof. By
the Equivalence Theorem, g∗∗ is of full range: Range(g∗∗) = S. By Theorem 7-
1, then, g∗∗ is dictatorial. Then another application of the Equivalence Theorem
shows g∗ is dictatorial. 
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